Abstract-This paper uses data from nationally representative household survey conducted in 17 African countries to analyse mobile adoption and usage. This paper shows that countries differ in their levels of ICT adoption and usage and also in factors that influence adoption and usage.
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Abstract-This paper uses data from nationally representative household survey conducted in 17 African countries to analyse mobile adoption and usage.
This paper shows that countries differ in their levels of ICT adoption and usage and also in factors that influence adoption and usage. Income and education vastly enhances mobile adoption but gender, age and membership in social networks have little impact. Income is the main explanatory variable for usage. In terms of mobile expenditure the study also finds linkages to fixed-line, work and public phone usages. These linkages need however be explored in more detail in future. Mobile expenditure is inelastic with respect to income, ie the share of mobile expenditure of individual income increases less than 1 0 .4 for each 1% increase in income. This indicates that people with higher income spend a smaller proportion of their income on mobile expenditure compared to those with less income.
The study provides tools to identify policy intervention to improve ICT take up and usage and define universal service obligations based on income and monthly usage costs. It help to put anum ber to what can be expected from lower access and usage costs in terms of market volume and number of new subscribers. Linking this to other economic data such as national household income and expenditure surveys and GDP calculation would allow to forecast the economic and social impact of policy interventions.
Concrete recommendations are being made for policy interventions and regulatory measures to decrease access and usage costs. 
T
The information, telecommunication and broadcasting sector is increasingly integrated into the day to day activities of businesses and lives of households and individuals worldwide. Numerous studies have shown that ICTs contribute to economic growth, employment and social inclusion. It is therefore important that policymakers monitor progress towards access and usage of ICTs. A paper by Roller and Waverman (2001) suggests that the spread of modem fixed-line networks in GECD countries was responsible for one third of output growth between 1970 and 1990 Country level data reveals a global digital divide between continents and countries but also within countries (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003) . Table 1 displays the difference between low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high-income countries for Internet, fixed-line and mobile density. It also display the same information for countries covered by this studies and the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) averages. The SSA average for Internet users and fixed-line users is lower than the low income average. It can also be seen from Table 1 that several countries from this 16-country sample are below the low income and SSA averages. Countries have a much lower ICT density compared to the low-income average. Table 2 and  Table 3 document the digital divide within countries for access to fixed telephony in urban areas compared to rural ones and knowledge about and usage of the Internet across disposable income quartiles. • weak telecommunications infrastructure • generally low level of economic activity • irregular or non-existent electricity supplies; and • lack of human resource capacity, lack of skills and brain drain.
The results from the researchlCTafrica.net household survey, however, shows that the monthly cost of telecommunication services is the main reason behind low 6 See also Sciadas (2003)   393   levels of access and usage.  TABLE 3  ICT KNOWLEDGE AND USE, AND MOBILE ACCESS ACROSS DISPOSABLE   INCOME CATEGORIES   16+ knowing  16+ using the  Owning a  what the  Internet  mobile phone  Internet is  or active SIM  card  lower top  lower  top  lower  top  three  dispo  three  dispo  three  dispo  dispo  sable  dispo  sable  dispo  sable  sable  inco  sable  inco  sable  inco  inco  me  inco  me  inco  me  me  quarti me  quarti me  quarti  quarti le  quarti Ie  quarti Ie  le  Ie  le  Benin  17%  33%  6%  16%  17%  63%  Botswana  14%  52%  2%  19%  53%  83%  Burkina  6%  17%  2%  10%  19%  50%  Faso  Cameroon  35%  54%  10%  25%  28%  74%  Cote d'l voire 12%  31%  4%  14%  33%  63%  Ethiopia  6%  18%  0%  3%  1%  11%  Ghana  26%  27%  5%  8%  53%  79%  Kenya  25%  52%  9%  32%  42%  79%  Mozambique 2%  10%  1%  3%  20%  49%  Namibia  16%  60%  4%  25%  37%  86%  Nigeria  35%  52%  10%  22%  74%  93%  Rwanda  4%  13%  1%  4%  4%  26%  Senegal  37%  71%  9%  14%  29%  77%  South Africa 42%  75%  7%  38%  54%  84%  Tanzania  6%  16%  1%  4%  14%  46%   Uganda  4%  15%  1%  7%  12%  46%  Zambia  39%  60%  1%  13%  36%  84% II. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The data that is being used for this study stems from surveys conducted by Research ICT Africa (RIA)
• The data is nationally" representative on a household level and for individuals 16 years of age or older. The survey was stratified into metropolitan, other urban and rural areas. Enumerator areas (EAs) were sampled for each stratum using probability proportional to size (pps). The individual to be selected for each household was randomly selected from all household members and visitors that stayed at the home on the night the household was visited and that were 16 years of age or older.
The RIA questionnaire was divided in three sections. The first part, the household rooster, collected information about all household members. The second part collected household related information. The head of the household or someone that manages the household answered part one and two. The third part, the individual section, was answered by a randomly selected individual 16 years of age or older that slept in the house the night of the interview and included household members and visitors. 8 These are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namib ia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The data for Zambia is not included in this analysis yet since the data had not been weighted by the time of submission of this article. 9 The data for Zambia and Nigeria are national extrapolations but not nationaIly representative. In Zambia the selection probabilities had to be estimated since enumerator ID informat ion was not unique. In Nigeria the sample was drawn only from 6 of 36 provinces. 394 together in the same housing unit or group of housing units, have common cooking arrangements and share financial resources. Maids, guards and baby-sitters that stay with a family are part of the household. A head of a household is a person who economically supports or manages the household or for reasons of age or respect, is considered as head by members of the household or declares himself or herself to be head of a household.
where k is a positive constant. Hence the "just noticeable" differences are increasing proportionally to the sequence of sources and can also been written by exponential function:
11 For example with n = 24 cells which have to be computed and $1000 the highest value, the equation would be given by 1000= (I + 0,35)23 12 See for example Maddala (1983) and Gourieroux (I 986) 13 For a more detailed discussionon this assumption see Long (1997) . 14 See Long(2007) pp 49-50for a proof.
The value of k can be seen as a percentage increase between adjacent scale values. The survey used 28 values, starting with a zero (not interested at all) and ending with an empty cell for amounts higher than listed. Equation (2) was used to compute the 2 nd amounts to 27 th amount. K was selected so that (I + k)"" equals the highest value on the list. 11 another might just be close to getting one and still saving money towards it. For both individuals it can only be observed that they do not have a mobile phone ie Mobile=O. The process leading to that decision is unobserved and referred to a latent variable. Probit or Logit models tie observable (independent variables) to the latent variable though contributions to the probability of the latent variable taking a value above or below a threshold that would lead to the observable outcome, adoption or not. Many factors are considered in the economic literature as influencing the latent variable,15 such as socio-economic factors (social networks, income, prices, household size, education, age and gender) and environmental factors (infrastructures, enumerator area, country's characteristics).
Piccoli et at (200 I) established that the education level of an individual influences ICTs adoption and usage, through influencing an individual's capability to use technology. The theory of technology use also points to age as a factor that influences when and how an individual uses technologies. Some studies indicate that age is a key factor in the use of technology, with younger people tending to exhibit higher use levels. Consequently, these individuals tend to use ICTs technologies more than older users.
Gender and technology studies have found that men and women adopt and use technology differently (Gefen & Table 5 in the appendix. displays the Probit model configuration and Table 6 in the appendix details the results for each country. Table 6 provides summary results without reporting coefficients, showing for each of the independent variables whether their impact on the probability of mobile adoption is significant and whether it is positive or negative. 17 The results suggest that the variables used to analyse mobile phone adoption contribute significantly to explaining the probability of adoption. Income increases the probability of mobile phone adoption as expected. Only for Ghana and Rwanda it wasn 't significant. Substituting individual income with disposable income increases the pseudo R 2 in both cases and let to income being significant with positive coefficient. Disposable income has the advantage over individual income that it takes into account the buying power of dependents that do not have own income. It does not generally lead to better results though. Income being a barrier to adoption has two consequences. First, people will increasingly adopt mobile telephony should their income increase. Secondly, they might 
IV. MOBIL E ADOPTION / AC CESS
This section analyses factors that contribute to the probability of an individual to adopting mobile telephony, ie either owning a mobile phone or active SIM card. The dependant variable is dichotomous and using linear regression models would not be appropriated.F Probit models are being used instead, assuming normal distributed error terms. The assumption about the error term is arbitrary and its validity cannot be tested." A model can only be identified once an assumption is imposed on the mean and variance of the error term. This implies that coefficients cannot be interpreted directly since they are influenced by the necessary assumptions. Changing the assumptions about the error term changes the values of the coefficients uniformly (Long , 2006) , but it does not affect the probability of an event occurring14. It affects the spread of the distribution but not the proportion of the distribution above or below the threshold (Long, 2006) .
The decision to adopt mobile telephony is the result of several factors which cannot be observed and which will be different for each individual. What can be observed is whether an individual has a mobile phone or active SIM card (Mobile =l) or not (Mobile-D), One individual might neither be able to afford nor be interested in a mobile phone while WTP data. Therefore the exponential payment ladder can be seen consistent with the error distribution of WTP values. The third argument Row et al (1996) put forward refers to the concept of "j ust noticeable" differences and they uses the example of light sources to explain this. A source of light has a brightness B. The differences between two of such sources is "just noticeable" if the difference can be detected in 75% of the time. When bringing these sources in a sequence arranged in order of increasing brightness BI, B 2, ... , Bn,so that each source is "just noticeable" to the preceding one, than the relationship to each other is given by Weber's law:
be adopting it at current income if access (handset) prices and usage cost would come down.
Age influences for some countries positively and for others negatively the probability of mobile adoption. Age is likely to impact positively the probability to adopt mobile up to certain level and then decreases. Using age" instead of age in subsequent research could get to the bottom of this. 18 The gender variable is mostly insignificant as expected (11 countries). Only in Senegal, Tanzania and Burkina Faso does being a woman decrease the probability of mobile telephony adoption. In South Africa and Mozambique it even increases the probability significantly.
The result from the Probit models confirm the assumptions about education as well as the rural areas. Membership in social networks contributed positively to the probability of mobile adoption in 7 out of 16 countries. For the remaining countries it was insignificant.
Randomly selected individuals 16 years from each household without mobile phone or active SIM card were asked for their willingness and ability to pay for a handset and what they think a handset would cost them. These average figures are being shown in Table 7 in the appendix. The difference between average willingness to pay and average expected costs confirms income as the main adoption barrier. Table 7 also indicates the number of new mobile phone users operators could expect should they offer mobiles for US$20, US$15 and US$10 respectively. 20US$ handsets would attract about 3 million new customers in Kenya and Ivory Coast, for example. Ethiopia could expect 2,6 million more users if the handset price would drop to US$10 and provided that SIM cards would be available. Ethiopia is the country with the widest gap between willingness to pay and expected cost and the country with the lowest mobile teledensity (see Table 1 ). The handset price is also known to fluctuate with the availability of SIM cards.
v. INCOME ELASTICITY / E-USAGE Perl (1983) , Taylor (1994) and Taylor (2002) developed telecommunication demand models that can be addressed price and income elasticities for public phones, mobile phones and local, national and international fixed-line call as well as cross price elasticities. 19 Universal Service Obligations (USO) in this context have been thoroughly discussed in the literature. 20 Wallsten (2001) finds that greatly reduced international settlement rates for telecom traffic between the United States and the rest of the world had the effect of reduced prices and increased traffic in developing countries due to relatively high price elasticities. However, Garbacz & Thompson (2005) point out that international calls are less of relevance for poor people in developing countries compared to local and national calls, where price elasticities are low. They also find that the mobile monthly price elasticity exceeds fixed-line price elasticity in developing countries by a substantial amount and suggest that wireline phones are substitutes in the mobile market while mobile phones are not substitutes in the wireline market but complements. This is to some extent contradicted by Esselaar & Stork (2005) who find studying usage data for nine African countries that mobile telephony is a substitute for fixed-line telephony across all income groups.
Clarke & Wallsten (2002) argue that universal service for the poor in developing countries is generally ineffective. Modelling income elasticities could establish alternative approaches to current universal service defmitions. Rather then specifying coverage or geographic spread, universal service obligations (USOs) could be in terms of costs for monthly usage packages that take into account existing income barriers.
Lee (1999), in estimating access demand for mobile networks, shows that per capita GDP and the size of the existing fixed-line network increase the probability of people subscribing to mobile telephone services. This implies that the mobile telephone network is interdependent with the fixed-line network.
Demand, as understood by economists, is defined as the amount of goods or services people are willing to buy at a certain price (ceteribus paribus -other things including income equal). In this sense, demand is a concept affected by buying power. A person may have needs but not demand du to income limitations. With insufficient income, demand can be zero or low even if the need is urgent. Demand or buying power for a goods or services arise from the consumers' preferences for specific goods or services. Thus defining a good or service, and studying how the consumer orders his/her preferences for such a good or service in relation to other available goods and services is crucial.
Demand arises from a previous knowledge of the good and a subjective evaluation of its benefits and costs. Communications services differ from other goods or services since some require a subscription prior to usage such as post paid mobile and fixed line services. Even for prepaid mobile services a distinction can be made between access (cost of a handset) and usage costs. Subscription is necessary to use the Internet as well in most cases (notable exception is the Internet cafe). In the case of telephony the access service provides utility to a customer in terms of granting the ability to make and receive calls, even though it is uncertain whether the ability will be exercised. This is the so-called option value (Hee Lee, 2006) .
For the purpose of analyzing demand income elasticity for mobile telecommunication services we assume that the potential usage basket of a consumer consists of calls (q) and a composite good (x) that represents all other goods and services. We further assume that the consumer's decision on individual demand for calls is made by maximizing a utility function within a given budget constraint. In addition to the factors of calls (q) and a composite good (x) affecting his/her utility, income (y) can be considered. Moreover, if call externality is incorporated in the utility of an individual, the number of existing subscribers who are making calls to and receiving calls from the individual affects the demand for calls. Thus, after including the size of the network (N) in order to reflect call externality, the utility function of a customer (U) is represented in expression (3):~(~=~+~+~+~b
Where a -log(A) and Z the socia-demographic factors set. The transformed demand function s for mobile phone services are then expanded by socia-economic factors and postulated to be offollowing form :
U=U(q,x ,N)
In(q) = a-ap+ PIn(y) + qfZ + E (8)
At the same time , the budget constraint considering access charge and call charge is given by Where r is the price of access to the telecommunications system , ;;r the price of a call, y is income of the consumer and p the price of the composite good x. For the utility function in (3), the number of calls represents direct benefits of using the mobile , while the number of subscribers represents indirect benefits through network size. Given the budget constraint in (4), and assuming the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and differentiable, using Lagrangian techniques the demand functions for calls and the composite good, as shown below in expressions (5) and (6), can be derived from the optimal solution of the utility function: 21 Haque (2007) suggests ways of testing for the functional form of the demand function for telecommunication services. This would be beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed with a separate paper.
Where q denotes use of the telephone network, p denotes the price of access and use, y denotes income, and u denotes a random error term. Network externalities as well as now socia-demographic factors can be included in this model as well. 21 Equation (7) can be transformed by taking the natural These functions differ from conventional demand functions in two aspects: The budget constraint is y-r, rather than y, which reflects the conditionality of having to purchase access to telecommunication services, and the demand functions depend upon the number of subscribers, which reflects the access and usage externalities. Perl (1983) , Taylor (1994 Taylor ( , 2002 and Taylor and Kridel (1990) developed telecommunication demand models that are now widely used in the literature. The model has the following form: 22 These finding can be explored further by using mean rank comparisons for the ratio mobile expenditure I disposable income.
The price variable used in the analysis is represented by the amount that an individual paid for access and usage of mobiles. However since country results are being computed individually, there will not be a change for any of the responses, the cost of the usage basket is the same for everyone in a country. This lets the price variable become a constant. Table 8 in the appendix presents the results from robust regressions round for each country using weighted data. Income is in each case significant and positively related to mobile expenditure.
The gender variable is insignificant for 10 countries which is somewhat surprising given that the average income of women is lower compared to that of men for all countries but Mozambique. However income is already taking care off in the equation. This means that apart of being at different income levels women spend the same on mobile phone as men. For Botswana, Cameroon, Mozambique and Namibia the gender variables was significant and negative, which means that women spend less. Nigeria had the only positive significant coefficient. 22 (6) The figure above shows the percentage change in mobile expenditure for a 1% income change. For all countries the mobile expenditure is inelastic with regard to income. Nigeria has the highest income elasticity and Mozambique the lowest. Since these are national figures based on cross-section data it implies that people with higher incomes spend a smaller proportion of their income on mobile telephony compared to low income households. Figure 2 confirms this. Income elasticity seems to be linked to relative cost of mobile usage, penetration and coverage. Those factors need to be explored in more detail in subsequent studies utilising supply side data and qualitative research. 
Ghana
Having a working fixed-line phon e at home is linked to higher mobile expenditure in 8 out of 16 countries. This can be explained by two factors. First, households with fixed-line phones are generally wealthier which might not directly be reflected in the individual income of the responded (dependents). Second, having a fixed-line phone at home provides more opportunity to talk , such as calling home. These results confirm the existence of a relationship between mobile and fixed-line networks. To contribute to the complementarity and substitutability discussion further the fixed-line expenditure would need to be investigated for any affect through the number of mobile phone users in the household as well. The survey data also can be used to explain usag e pattern in more detail.
Public phone usage has only been significant for 6 out of 16 countries. For Benin, Cameroon and South Africa it has a negative affect on mobile phone expenditure and for Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Senegal a positive one. This too needs to be analyzed in more detail. Public phon es might predominantly be used by lower income groups or might actually substitute mobile phone expenditure. More country specific research is required to come to definite conclusions.
Equally for the impact of access to a work phone or private use. Fore five countries the work phone variable shows as positive and significant. While having access to a work phone is a good indicator for income one might have also have suspected a negative impact on mobile usage expenditure since the work-phone could be used to substitute for mobile calls.
Age has a significant and negative impact in six countries where that variable is significant. For those countries a youth user's effect can be established.
The main objective is to estimate demand elasticities. A distinction is made between income and price elasticities. Income elasticity describes the magnitude and also therefore the responsiveness of a demand change for a good in respect to a income change. Graphically expressed, the income elasticity is -ceteris paribus-the slope of the demand curve , dependent on the income. 
VI. PRIC E ELASTICITY / E-U SAGE
Price elasticity describes the magnitude and also therefore the responsiveness of a demand change for a good in respect to a price change. Graphically expressed, the price elasticity is -ceteris paribus-the slope of the demand curve, dependent on the price. e = _t-.=Q.-:I Q=..
Y
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Where: Q= quantity demanded; P = price of the good and e p = price elasticity.
The price elasticity of demand is in almost all cases, except for inferior goods, negative, if the price increases the demand decreases. To simplify the notation, demand elasticities are in general expressed in absolute value and therefore expressed as positive Frank & Bemanke, 2003).
Milne (2006) provides a very intuitive argument for the changing structure of price elasticity in a hypothetical case. She argues that when phones become available for the first time in a low-income community and usage charges or tariffs are relatively high (in terms of income) people will make limited number of essential calls. In such a scenario, even if the prices falls by a small amount the number of such calls; for instance in an emergency or substituting a telephone call for a bus ride to a city, will not increase by much. In other words 399 price elasticity will be relatively low (much less than -I). But, as prices fall, in a much cheaper service environment , she argues that people will start using the phone for many nonessential purposes; ranging from relationship maintenance and simple conveniences. Added to this, pricing innovations that enable poorer people to purchase small denomination pre-paid calling cards to make phone calls it is intuitive that the number of calls made will increase significantly. Milne (2006) argues that when this happens, the price elasticity will rapidly rise towards -lor even more than -I.
One of the biggest problems in estimating price elasticity of demand (PED) for telecom services in developing country situations is the lack of accurate usage data. Unlike in developed countries where usage is easily obtainable from monthly bills for post-paid connections, the vast majority in developing countries, in the case of the current study, between 78% and 99% have no billing records (for prepaid shares see Table 9 ). Many use public phones, phones at work or other people' s phones which equally does not generate records. Another difficulty is that cross section data, like the one that is being analysed here, is not suitable to calculate price elasticities since it only captures data for one snapshot in time. Changes in consumer behaviour due to price changes can only be analysed using time series data. Cross section data only allows a rough glimpse at price elaticities by using contingent valuation methods. Respondents with mobile phone or active SIM card were asked how the would react to price decreases and increases. The answers to these questions are being displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . Figure 3 shows that the vast majority of respondents would make more calls if prices would come down. Senegal and Ethiopia are the two countries with the highest share of respondents that would use the saved money for something else. Figure 4 shows how respondents state that they would react to a doubling and halving of call charges. What can be seen is the response is asymmetrical, ie respondents would react to price increases stronger than they would do to price decreases. However, approximating price elasticity from these two contingent valuations results is strictly speaking not possible. Respondents state their preferences and do not reveal it (observed behaviour reacting to price changes).
Table presents data on the untapped market, those 16 years or older that do not have a mobile or active SIM card at present. It shows the results for the number of people that could be reached with US$I, US$2 and US$5 Average Revenue per Users (ARPU) business models.
VB. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that countries differ in their levels of lCT adoption and usage and also in the factors that influence adoption and usage. Income and education vastly enhances mobile adoption but gender, age and membership in social networks have little impact. Income is the main explanatory variable for usage. In terms of mobile expenditure the study also finds linkages to fixed-line, work and public phone usages. These linkages need however be explored in more detail in future. Mobile expenditure proofs to be inelastic with regard to income, ie as income increases mobile expenditure increases to a lesser extent indicating its importance in individual budgets.
Key policy interventions would be regulatory measure to increase access and usage of mobile services by promoting network investment. The current super profits being enjoyed by operators across the continent as a result of prices that are amongst the highest in the world need to be moderated. In most markets there is not effective competition requiring regulatory interventions to ensure cost based wholesale and retail pricing.
Increasing Coverage: Licence fees for infrastructure investment should cover the administrative and usage costs of national resources only. The current high cost of licences in most countries used to generated funds for state coffers translate in high prices for consumers as operators recover their licence costs. Countries need to look at incentives to encourage networks rollout not disincentives.
Wider Access: Access prices can be reduced by exempting telecommunication equipment, in particular mobile handsets and services from import duties and additional taxes.
Allow more Usage: Policy measures to increase the competition within the industry are the best mechanism to reduce usage costs. In a competitive environment the operator can choose to compete on price or on service quality. Regulatory measure can improve competition on price by creating price transparency.
Price Transparency: Contract and prepaid tariffs vary across operators to an extent that a product to product comparison is impossible for consumers. Non-transparent pricing, including rapidly changing promotions and misleading media campaigns , make it difficult for end-users to make informed decisions. This prevents operators from having to compete on prices and leads to higher average prices. Establishing price transparency on the basis of published monthly usage baskets will make the cost to the end-user transparent and force operators to compete on price or service quality.
Cost-based Interconnection rates: Above cost interconnection charges are often used by dominant operators to restrict small operator from gaining market share. High interconnection charges make off-net calls expensive and punishes consumer or small operator. Cost based interconnection rates (or benchmarked on cost base) increase the competition between operators and hence lead to lower usage cost.
Licences for Low ARPU business models: Regulators should award additional licences to applicants that are able to offer low ARPU business models, preferably below U8$2.
The correct policy and regulatory measures can boost mobile access and usage. Avoiding sector and service specific levies and additional taxes will result in lower recovery costs and therefore lower prices. Lower prices would allow millions of people currently unable to afford to access mobile services to do so and those currently restricting their usage as a result of the high cost of services to use services more extensively and effectively. This is likely to produce greater profits for companies overall and Governments will as a consequence have even more money in their coffers due to taxes on greater operator revenues. 
